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O
n July 21, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
At more than 2,300 pages, this is a large and wide-
ranging law with implications for virtually every aspect of
banking and finance in the United States. It creates new
government agencies, new obligations and powers for exist-
ing financial regulators, and new limits on the permissible
activities of banking firms. The process of fully implement-
ing the Act will stretch over many years and will include
more than 240 rule-makings and 60 studies by various
agencies. 
As the legislation was being crafted, I expressed concerns
about the portion of the bill that created a new government-
run resolution mechanism for large failing financial
institutions. The discretion to shield creditors, especially
short-term creditors, if one of these firms were to be closed
could produce ambiguity for investors. Lingering belief in
the possibility of such protection could dampen the market
discipline the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to enhance. 
But the new law also does some very good things. For
instance, it tightens constraints on risk-taking by large 
complex financial institutions — and it provides for more
consistent consolidated oversight of those entities when 
different affiliates have different functional regulators. It
also creates a stronger and broader mechanism for coopera-
tion and coordination among federal agencies with financial 
regulatory and supervisory responsibilities. 
There’s another accomplishment of the Dodd-Frank Act
that I think is very important but has gone largely unnoted.
The legislation takes a significant step toward diminishing
the role of the central bank in the allocation of private 
credit, and instead placing that responsibility in the hands
of the U.S. Treasury and the Congress.
At the Richmond Fed, we have a history of arguing for
just such a delineation of those responsibilities. My former
colleague Marvin Goodfriend proposed a “credit accord”
between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, analogous to
the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951 that allowed the Fed to 
conduct interest rate policy independent of government
financing needs. The case for a credit accord rests on the
fact that the provision of central bank credit to private 
borrowers, like other public-sector credit provisions, is an
act of fiscal policy and should be subject to the normal
checks and balances the Constitution provides for the 
distribution of public funds. In addition, interventions in
private credit markets could compromise the central bank’s
ability to conduct monetary policy independently of the 
legislative and executive branches. Such independence has
been crucial to the Fed’s pursuit of price stability since the
1970s, and thus beneficial to the larger economy.   
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The Dodd-Frank Act
reduces the Fed’s emergency
lending powers by amending
the portion of the Federal
Reserve Act — Section 13(3) —




Most of the vast expansion of
Fed credit beyond depository
institutions was made under
this authority — the lending
connected with Bear Stearns and AIG, for example, as well
as the special credit programs for the commercial paper and
asset-backed securities markets. The Dodd-Frank Act only
permits lending programs with “broadly based” eligibility
that provide liquidity to the financial system, and only with
the written consent of the Secretary of the Treasury. Fed
lending to aid individual nonbank institutions under Section
13(3) is prohibited. 
These provisions, along with a number of new reporting
requirements, reduce the scope of Fed emergency lending
powers and improve accountability, though they stop short
of restricting the Fed from allocating credit entirely.
Nonetheless, the Dodd-Frank Act takes an important step
toward a credit accord, and any journey begins with but a
single step.  RF
Placing Limits on Fed ‘Credit Policy’
JEFFREY M. LACKER
PRESIDENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND